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Abstract—Network virtualization enables multi-tenancy over
physical network infrastructure, with a side-effect of increased
network complexity. Software-defined networking (SDN) is a
novel network architectural model – one where the control
plane is separated from the data plane by a standardized API
– which aims to reduce the network management overhead.
However, as the SDN model itself is evolving, its application
to multi-tenant virtualized networks raises multiple security
challenges. In this paper, we present a security analysis of SDN-
based multi-tenant virtualized networks: we outline the security
assumptions applicable to such networks, define the relevant
adversarial model, identify the main attack vectors for such
network infrastructure deployments and finally synthesize a set
of high-level security requirements for SDN-based multi-tenant
virtualized networks. This paper sets the foundation for future
design of secure SDN-based multi-tenant virtualized networks.
Index Terms—Security; Software Defined Networks; Network
Virtualization; Multi-tenant Virtualized Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid development of cloud services made a successful
case for virtualization, which allows infrastructure providers
to multiplex physical resources and provide complete platform
and network resources to multiple tenants.
Multi-tenant cloud infrastructure relies on virtualization of
both hosts and network infrastructure. In both cases, system
virtualization presents a trade-off between portability and
tenant isolation on one hand, and virtualization overhead on
the other hand. For host virtualization, virtual machines (VMs)
are a widely used approach to enable multi-tenancy in the
Infrastructure-as-a-Service cloud model. Similarly, a variety
of approaches exist for network virtualization, operating on
different levels. Sherwood [1] described five dimensions that
must be sliced to enable network virtualization: bandwidth,
topology, traffic, device CPU and the forwarding tables (also
called forwarding information base, FIB). Given the inherently
distributed nature of network infrastructure, no single compo-
nent modification can satisfactorily slice the network across
all five dimensions. Multi-tenancy is among the capabilities
enabled by virtualization. In the context of infrastructure
clouds, we consider the following characteristics of network
multi-tenancy:
• A tenant corresponds to a customer using a particular
virtual network;
• Tenants may belong to different administrative domains;
• Tenants expect network isolation of their domain;
• Physical resource sharing is fully abstracted, with tenants
unaware of other neighbours;
• Tenants may create multiple distinct virtual network
instances and topologies.
By enabling network multi-tenancy with strong isolation,
network virtualization allows infrastructure providers to mul-
tiplex the network infrastructure among network service
providers, paving the way for new services and better hardware
resource utilization. However, network infrastructure multi-
tenancy comes at the cost of increased complexity, leading
to higher management costs and new security risks. Software-
defined networking (SDN) is a network architectural approach
evolved from the “Clean slate” initiative [2], which proposed
to decouple the network forwarding functionality from the
control and management logic. The initiative aimed to im-
prove network management flexibility based on clear network
abstractions: the management applications, which expresses
the operator goals on a high level; the network hypervisor,
which implements control program instructions based on a
global network view and computes forwarding state for search
router/switch; the network operating system (NOS), builds
the global network view and implements configurations on
switches; and finally the routing and switching equipment,
which forwards packets as instructed. This paved the way
for the wide-scale use of commodity hardware for network
infrastructure, flexible software implementation of network
functionality and new network virtualization abstractions. The
SDN architectural approach continues to be a work in progress.
Despite a large body of contributions to the SDN architecture
([3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]), network operating systems ([9],
[10], [11], [12]) and the communication between the data plane
and the control plane (also referred to as “southbound API”,
[13]), SDN continues to evolve, requiring further attention to
aspects such as security, scalability and policy enforcement.
A. Contribution
In this paper, we review the security challenges for multi-
tenant virtualized network infrastructure based on the SDN
architecture. We briefly describe the application of the SDN
approach to the multi-tenant virtualized network infrastructure.
We introduce an adversarial model suitable for multi-tenant
virtualized network infrastructure using the SDN architecture
and identify a set of relevant attack vectors. Finally, we present
a list of security requirements towards SDN-based multi-tenant
virtualized network infrastructures.
B. Organization
The paper is organized as follows: in Section II we present
the related work; next, we introduce the adversarial model for
SDN-based multi-tenant virtualized network infrastructures in
Section III, followed by a description of the relevant attack
vectors in Section IV. We continue by listing the requirements
for SDN-based multi-tenant virtualized network infrastructures
in Section V and conclude in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide an overview of related work on
secure SDN architectures.
In [4], the authors presented Ethane (Figure 1), an enter-
prise network architecture which allows network managers
to control the network using a unified interface. Reflecting
the identified enterprise network characteristics, the Ethane
network consists of commodity switches and one or multiple
controllers. The former are responsible for maintaining the
FIB and contain a local switch manager to communicate
with the controller. The latter handles host registration and
authentication, tracks network bindings, verifies permissions
and grants access, as well as enforces resource limits on the
managed flows. In addition, the authors described a high-level
policy definition language for network management policies.
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Fig. 1. The main components in Ethane [4]
NOX was introduced in [9], as a network operating system
which presents network management programs with a cen-
tralized programming model and a global view of the system
state. This allows network management programs to rely on
simpler graph processing algorithms to compute the shortest
paths and to operate with higher-level abstractions, such as
users and host names, rather than MAC and IP addresses. NOX
consists of several distinct controller processes operating on a
global network view built by NOX based on the process com-
munication with the data plane. The global view is based on
switch topology, user location, connected network components
(e.g. hosts and middleboxes), as well as bindings between the
names and addresses. Controller processes use the global view
to make management decisions, which are later implemented
on the routing and switching equipment over the OpenFlow
API [13].
In [11], the authors presented FortNOX, a software ex-
tension for role-based authorization and security constraints
enforcement for the NOX OpenFlow Controller. FortNOX
detects rule conflicts, i.e. situations when candidate OpenFlow
rules modify network flows specified by existing rules, and
takes appropriate actions, depending on the authorization of
the rule requestor. Role-based authentication is used to deter-
mine the security authorization of each rule producer, enforc-
ing the principle of least privilege to ensure integrity of the me-
diation process. FortNOX consists of four components: a role-
based source authentication module to validate signatures for
each flow rule insertion request; a conflict analyzer to evaluate
each new flow rule against existing active flow rules; a state
table manager to track the current flow rules; and finally a flow
rule time-out callback interface to update the aggregate flow
table upon rule expiration. For conflict resolution, FortNOX
converts all flow rules into ‘Alias Reduced Rules’, allowing
to perform a rule set conflict evaluation. FortNOX includes
a security directive translator ifor the block, deny, allow,
redirect, quarantine, undo, constrain, and info directives; such
directives are used for high-level threat mitigation which are
in turn translated to flow rules to handle suspicious traffic.
FortNOX has been implemented and evaluated as an extension
to NOX and found to introduce an average overhead of less
than 7 ms for evaluating a candidate flow rule against 1000
existing flow rules.
In [7] the authors presented ‘Fresco’, an OpenFlow security
application development framework, which facilitates rapid
prototyping of composable detection and mitigation mod-
ules. Such modules represent elementary building blocks of
Fresco and contain the following interfaces: input, output,
event, parameter, and action. The main functions provided by
Fresco are script to module translation, database management,
event management and instance execution. Implementation of
policies defined by composable applications is ensured by
the Security Enforcement Kernel built into the fabric of the
network operating system. Furthermore, the paper contains
a description of a collection of Fresco modules, several
composed security applications and a performance evaluation
of Fresco. Fresco can be integrated as a security extension
module into other network operating systems – such as NOX.
Finally, in “Rosemary: A Robust, Secure, and High-
Performance Network Operating System” [12], the authors
present a network operating system focusing on network
resilience in the presence of faulty or malicious applications
by creating sandboxed environments for network applications.
Sandboxing (also called micro-NOS) is achieved by launching
each application in a separate process context with access
to all of the libraries that the application requires. Each
Micro-NOS also contains a resource monitor to supervise the
applications and operates within the permission structure of
Rosemary network operating system. In turn, the Rosemary
network operating system is an application running on a
commodity Linux distribution. The isolation offered by the
micro-NOS allows to improve robustness, such that faulty or
malicious applications are prevented from crashing the entire
network operating system. Furthermore, the paper also aims to
address security aspects in order to prevent malicious network
applications from accessing internal data structures of other
network applications. This is achieved by implementing an
AppZone sandbox, where privileged system calls made by a
network application are interposed and verified by the sandbox
framework. To avoid the declared ‘20-30%’ performance over-
head, the authors recommend two optimisations called ‘request
pipelining’ and ‘trusted execution’. The latter in essence
removes the sandbox isolation, allowing the application to
run as a kernel process; however, this makes the security
advantages of Rosemary less evident. Finally, the authors
present the performance evaluation results, which show that
the Rosemary network operating system performs roughly on
par with the NOX [9] approach on a 1G link and can perform
on par with NOX on a 10G link with the ‘trusted execution’
optimisation in place. This contribution highlights the need
for improved security in the architectures of the proposed
network operating system. However, one major drawback of
the proposed approach is that it ignores distribution aspects,
despite significant progresses in distributed network operating
system design [10] and the demonstrated need for physical
distribution of the control plane [14].
Kreutz et al presented a list of seven attack vectors identified
in SDNs [15]: a. Forged or faked traffic flows; b. Attacks
on vulnerabilities in switches; c. Attacks on control plane
communications; d. Attacks on and vulnerabilities in network
controllers; e. Lack of mechanisms to ensure trust between
the controller and management applications; f. Attacks on and
vulnerabilities in administrative stations; g. Lack of trusted
resources for forensics and remediation. However, only part
of the above attack vectors are exclusively relevant to SDN
networks. In this paper, we focus on attack vectors specific
for SDN-based multi-tenant virtualized network architectures.
The SDN network architectural model abstracts the com-
plexity of network virtualization; however, in adopting it we
must revisit the set of network virtualization mechanisms,
identify the most relevant attack vectors, define a relevant
adversarial model and outline a set of security requirements
towards SDN-based multi-tenant virtualized networks.
III. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARIAL MODEL
In this section, we introduce the SDN system model fol-
lowed by an example scenario. We next define an adversarial
model for SDN-based multi-tenant virtualized networks.
A. SDN system model
A conceptual model of the SDN architecture is depicted in
Figure 2, and described below based on the SDN architectural
model presented in [8].
• The data plane contains both hardware and software rout-
ing equipment. This component implements the routing
policies that satisfy the goals of the network administra-
tor. It lacks decision logic and is optimized for forwarding
speed. Packets that do not match any policy are either
discarded or communicated to the control plane through
the southbound API.
• Southbound API is a vendor-agnostic set of instructions
implemented by the routing equipment on the data plane.
It allows bi-directional communication between the data
and the control planes.
• Control plane is a logically distributed abstraction layer
that transforms high-level network operator goals into
discrete routing policies based on a global network view.
It contains a distributed network operating system, which
builds and maintains the global network view as well
as communicates with the equipment on the data plane.
The control plane also includes the network hypervisor,
which multiplexes the available network resources among
multiple users with distinct virtual network topologies.
• Management applications are used by network adminis-
trators to express their network configuration goals using
a set of high-level comments. They could also include
software-based network management components such as
firewalls, intrusion detection systems, traffic shapers, etc.
The above SDN system model will be used as a basis for
the adversarial model and threat analysis in the subsequent
sections.
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Fig. 2. SDN system model. Letters mark attack vectors, presented in
Section IV.
B. SDN Multi-tenant Network Scenario
As an example scenario, consider the cloud network in-
frastructure model, where tenants purchase virtual network re-
sources (e.g. bandwidth, switching capabilities) from network
infrastructure providers. Tenants are represented by the Virtual
Topologies layer in Figure 2. The parameters of the virtual
network resources agreed upon by the network infrastructure
provider and tenants are defined by a Quality of Service (QoS)
agreement.
In a shared, multi-tenant virtual network environment, the
tenants only have a view of the network infrastructure limited
to their administrative domain and are not aware about the
presence of other tenants. Furthermore, tenants do not have
direct access to the configuration of the underlying data
plane infrastructure and instead administer their own network
domain through routing policies, which are then interposed
by the network hypervisor and communicated through the
southbound API to the data plane. Enabled by the capabilities
of the SDN architectural model, tenants launch their own net-
work management applications (as defined in Section III-A).
Such network management applications can be made available
both the network infrastructure provider and by third party
application providers.
C. Adversarial model assumptions
We present our assumptions regarding SDN-based multi-
tenant virtualized networks in the presence of an adversary.
Assumption of hardware integrity: Recent media reve-
lations have raised the issue of hardware tampering en route to
deployment sites [16], [17]. We assume that the cloud provider
has taken necessary technical and non-technical measures to
prevent such hardware tampering.
Assumption of physical security: We assume physical
security of the data centres where the network infrastructure
is deployed. This assumption holds both when the network
infrastructure provider owns and manages the respective data
center (as in the case of Amazon Web Services, Google
Compute Engine, Microsoft Azure, etc.) and when the network
infrastructure provider utilizes the capacity of a data center
operated by a third party (e.g. CloudSigma), since physical
security can be observed, enforced and verified through known
best practices by third-party organizations. This assumption
is important for building higher-level hardware and software
security guarantees for the components of the network infras-
tructure.
Assumption of cryptographic security: We assume sym-
metric and public-key encryption schemes are semantically
secure and that the adversary cannot obtain the plain text of
encrypted messages. We also assume the signature scheme
is unforgeable, and that the message authentication code
algorithm correctly verifies message integrity and authenticity.
Finally, we assume that the adversary, with a high probability,
cannot predict the output of a pseudorandom function.
D. Adversary capabilities
We next describe specific capabilities for adversaries (de-
noted by ADV). We adopt the Yao-Dolev threat model [18],
such that the adversary can overhear, intercept, and synthesize
any message and is only limited by the constraints of the
employed cryptographic methods. Furthermore, we assume
that the adversary can analyse the traffic patterns in the
network through passive attacks and may disrupt or degrade
network connectivity to achieve its goals, such as e.g. force
the sender and the receiver to choose a less secure form
of communication. While we prioritise adversaries aiming
to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of data in
network infrastructure deployments, we also aim to limit the
capabilities of attackers to mount Denial-of-Service attacks to
disrupt connectivity. We denote this as ADV A.
We define two additional complementary adversarial types.
Acting as a tenant (e.g. through impersonation), the adversary
obtains new capabilities in addition to the ones described
above; we define this as ADV B. In this case the adversary
is able to perform the following actions using valid network
tenant credentials1:
1) Send valid tenant packages with an arbitrary content and
frequency to the components it can reach;
2) Attempt to impersonate other tenants;
3) Install arbitrary management applications and issue arbi-
trary policies within its network domain;
4) Use the cryptographic material at its disposal to attempt
to decrypt intercepted network traffic that is sent and
received by other tenants.
Furthermore, the adversary may manage to take over one of
the SDN controller components or some control of the network
operating system. We denote this as ADV C; it will be able
to perform the following actions:
1) Affect the network communication of the SDN-based
infrastructure by sending valid packets with an arbitrary
content and frequency to all reachable network compo-
nents;
2) Attempt to impersonate network infrastructure compo-
nents;
3) Issue malicious policies aiming to either monitor, distort
or disrupt network traffic;
4) Use the cryptographic material at its disposal to attempt
to decrypt intercepted network traffic that is sent and
received by other network infrastructure components.
IV. ATTACK VECTORS
We review the attack vectors relevant for SDN-based multi-
tenant virtualized networks considering the adversarial models
presented in Section III.
A. Vulnerabilities in the control plane
Along with ease of network administration, a central control
plane introduces a primary attack target for an adversary mo-
tivated to take control of the network. Taking over the control
plane component in the SDN architecture allows the adversary
to obtain full control of the network communication, different
from traditional networks where communication control is
distributed throughout various network components. Possible
solutions include splitting the controller into several domains
or distributing the control plane over several hosts, such that
issued policies are verified on a different component before
deployment.
1Related adversary capabilities are defined in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-ietf-nvo3-security-requirements-04
B. Attacks on control plane communications
To manipulate network policies, the adversary may attempt
to spoof the control plane communication (both among the
components of a distributed controller and between manage-
ment applications, controller and data plane). Possible solu-
tions include enforcing authenticated and encrypted commu-
nication between all of the control plane components, as well
as secure enrolment mechanism for management applications
and data plane devices.
C. Lack of a trust chain between the management applications
and the data plane
While the effort on defining the SDN architecture is still in
progress, it is clear that management applications belong to a
different security domain than the network operating system,
and can be launched by malicious administrators or issue
conflicting policies. Both detecting and preventing malicious
policy deviations is challenging: a tenant can only observe
the traffic after a change has been applied, but can not obtain
and examine snapshots of the data plane FIB; similarly, there
is no mechanism to establish a trust chain between tenant
commands and entries in the FIB. Possible solutions can be
adapted from the ones employed – with varying success –
on platform operating systems: verification of code origin and
information flow control; however, such mechanisms do not
satisfy malicious policy detection requirements.
D. Attacks on policies and rules in programmable networks
Even if the integrity of policies remains intact, the ad-
versary may issue malicious policies that modify or disable
the effect of legitimate policies already in place (specifically
in the scenario with such network management applications
implement functionality of network middleboxes). This type
of attack is difficult to detect and prevent, since the malicious
policies might be indistinguishable from legitimate ones up to
the point when the combined policy is deployed (furthermore,
it requires a robust definition of a “malicious policy”). Possible
solutions are to establish policy hierarchies and perform policy
integration verification against some pre-determined invariants
prior to deployment, to ensure that the resulting modifications
remain within the basic policy framework. As policy updates
may occur interactively in response to changing network
patterns, both static analysis of policies and a pre-deployment
simulation may be required.
E. Resource limit violations
A malicious tenant may deploy network management appli-
cations that exploit vulnerabilities in network service isolation
in order to gain network resources beyond the allocated quota
defined in the QoS agreement. Possible solutions include
adding network operating system capabilities for fine-grained
monitoring of management applications to prevent resource
overallocation. This in turn requires a well-defined network
resource model based on clear definitions of network resources
and their respective capacities.
F. Attacks on virtual switches and network gateways
As pointed out in Section III-D, an adversary that con-
trols a virtual network infrastructure component (such as a
virtual switch) can attempt to impersonate other virtual net-
work infrastructure components, spoof traffic and negatively
affect tenant isolation. Possible solutions include integrity
verification of virtual network infrastructure components and
protecting the cryptographic secrets necessary for network
access using a hardware root of trust.
G. Weak bandwidth isolation as attack vehicle
One of the consequences of NIC virtualization is a weaken-
ing of QoS guarantees, since most NIC virtualization imple-
mentations do not support guaranteed bandwidth [19]. While
this does not directly affect data integrity and confidentiality,
manipulating bandwidth allocation between tenants sharing a
resource can be used in order to force a policy change (e.g.
trigger a more permissive policy that is activated when the
available bandwidth falls below a certain threshold). Possible
solutions include widespread proliferation of bandwidth isola-
tion techniques such as described in [20], as well as including
the effects of bandwidth changes into network policy security
testing.
V. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we outline a set of initial security require-
ments for SDN-based multi-tenant virtualized networks, based
on the adversarial model described in Section III and the attack
vectors in Section IV:
1) IV-A: The SDN control plane must implement an access
control model that limits the effects that vulnerabilities in
controllers can have on tenant domains. This can prevent
an adversary from simultaneously gaining control over
the functionality of the SDN controller component at all
privilege levels and in all roles.
2) IV-A: A dedicated entity must verify the policies to be
implemented by the SDN control plane before deploy-
ment.
3) IV-B: All communication between control plane com-
ponents must the authenticated, and a secure enrolment
mechanism for management applications and data plane
devices must be in place.
4) IV-C: A mechanism must be in place to offer traceability
and non-repudiation for all configuration commands and
policies issued by network management applications.
5) IV-D: A mechanism must be in place to enforce strong
network policy isolation, such that the effects of policies
in a certain tenant domain have no effect on other
domains. Furthermore, the infrastructure provider must be
able to enforce strict boundaries on the effects of policies
within tenant domains.
6) IV-D: New network management policies must run
through an integration verification engine prior to de-
ployment, to minimize or exclude the effect of malicious
policies on the network configuration.
7) IV-E: A mechanism must be in place to ensure that net-
work management applications do not allocate resources
beyond the assigned quota. To do this, the NOS may
apply advanced policing mechanisms – e.g. based on ex-
isting extensions, such as in [11] – that keep fine-grained
tracking of management applications resource utilization
and prevent them from making over-allocations.
8) IV-F: Integrity of virtual network components must be
verified prior to deployment and the cryptographic mate-
rial required for their network access must be protected
with a hardware root of trust.
9) IV-G: Policy-based routing decisions must not be af-
fected by vulnerabilities in bandwith isolation between
tenants. To clarify, consider a network setup with two
types of paths: low-bandwidth, low-cost, low-security
permanent paths (type-A paths) and high-bandwidth,
high-cost, high-security switched paths (type-B paths).
Consider further that a legitimate tenant has configured a
policy to distribute different types of traffic (low-value
and high-value traffic) among the type-A and type-B
paths respectively. An adversary capable of modifying
the bandwidth allocated to the paths of the legitimate
tenant should not succeed in redirecting high-value traffic
through type-A paths.
10) IV-G: Software and hardware network components must
offer equally strong bandwidth isolation properties. In the
current networks, the data plane components include both
software switches and routers deployed on commodity
platforms and specialized hardware equipment imple-
mented using application-specific integrated circuits. As
pointed out in [19], software-based data plane compo-
nents lack many of the features currently implemented
in specialized hardware switches and routers. Strong
bandwidth isolation is one of the features which must
be improved in the software implementations.
We plan to address in our forthcoming work the above secu-
rity requirements towards SDN-based multi-tenant virtualized
networks.
VI. CONCLUSION
Integration of large-scale multi-tenant virtualized network
infrastructure with the SDN architectural model presents a set
of unsolved security challenges. In this paper, we perform
a high-level analysis of SDN-based multi-tenant virtualized
networks. We present three security assumptions about such
networks, that are necessary for defining a secure virtualized
network infrastructure. Based on these assumptions, we define
the relevant adversarial model and identify the main attack
vectors for such network infrastructure deployments. Finally,
based on the defined adversarial model and resulting attack
vectors, we outlined a set of high-level security requirements
for SDN-based multi-tenant virtualized networks. The adver-
sarial model, attack vector analysis and high-level security
requirements defined in this paper serve as an initial input
towards future design work of secure and trusted SDN-based
multi-tenant virtualized networks.
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